Introduction
The Sandys White Paper was the key defence document in Britain's cold war history. It was the pivot on which British policy turned. Before 1957, a conscript army had continued from the Second World War to fulfil British defence commitments.
Afterwards, Britain finally and fully embraced the doctrine of nuclear deterrence as the key organising concept of its defence posture. This allowed widespread cuts: military personnel would be reduced from 690,000 to 625,000 within twelve months, and to 375,000 by the end of 1962. 1 The British commitment to Europe enshrined in the British Army of the Rhine (BAOR) was slashed, the surface fleet was cut back, and the strength of Fighter Command was reduced. For a generation of young British men, Sandys called an end to National Service, ensuring that none would be compelled to undertake military service for the rest of the twentieth century. Finally, Sandys'
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The importance of these four main strands (the heavy reduction in conventional military forces, the ending of conscription, the commitment to nuclear deterrence, and the fostering of anti-nuclear sentiment) varied greatly in the thinking of the Conservative Government in 1957, but have all been the subject of historical enquiry. For example, rows about the cuts in conventional forces dominated the formulation of the White
Paper with the Chiefs of Staff bitterly opposing the reductions. The paper went through no less than thirteen 'final' versions, and as Peter Hennessy has put it, 'there was blood on every page'. 2 This aspect of Sandys has attracted a good deal of historical attention.
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There are also widespread assumptions about the social consequences of ending conscription. Writers on the 1960s have long since considered the point when the last National Servicemen left uniform a key cultural moment. As Christopher Brooker put it in 1969, 'the social consequences of the decision to place so much store by [the] "independent nuclear deterrent"… were in many ways to be even greater than its political and military repercussions'. 4 On the adoption of the doctrine of nuclear deterrence, the revolutionary nature of Sandys can be overstated. British strategy had incorporated the notion of deterrence for some years. It was pretty well fully articulated in the 1955 White Paper, for example, which argued that nuclear weapons brought not despair but hope. 5 New in 1957 was the argument that a deterrent posture allowed concomitant reductions in conventional forces. Again, the origins of the Sandys Paper's nuclear commitment has been mined in some important works. 6 Lastly, there are the political consequences of this deterrent doctrine; or perhaps it would be better described as the political consequences of the way in which this doctrine was announced. It is a commonplace in the literature on the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament to stress its origins in the Sandys White Paper's famous admission that 'it must be frankly recognised that there is at present no means of providing adequate protection for the people of this country against the consequences of an attack with nuclear weapons'. 7 Yet the reasons why such an admission was made have yet to be sufficiently probed: after all, a deterrent posture did not preclude the government continuing its previous argument that home defence would go a long way to mitigating the effects of nuclear attack. The importance of this phraseology, both within the report and for its reception, can be seen in a fifth and neglected effect of the Sandys White Paper: the slashing of the civil and home defence budget by over 50%.
The purpose of this article is to explore the home defence context of the Sandys White
Paper. It argues that 'passive' defence against nuclear weapons is the White Paper's forgotten paradigm and had an enormous effect on how the wider policy of deterrence was framed and expounded. The cuts in civil defence expenditure represented a revolutionary break with the pre-1957 policy of providing 'survival measures' and required justification beyond the merely financial, and this was achieved by linking reduced provision to the new deterrent posture. But despite the White Paper stressing the need for continued civil defence measures as an insurance, the Government's policy was swept away by the 'admission' that there was no adequate defence against hydrogen bombs; moreover, the civil defence passages of the paper, culled of all policy announcements or even of existing measures, were certainly not strong enough to convince anyone that the Government believed in civil defence as a viable policy.
Later, the admission would be seized upon by the disarmament movement as a stick with which to beat the deterrent policy itself. Also, the home defence aspect of the Sandys White Paper sheds interesting new light on the report's formulation, and suggests that more emphasis should be placed on its pre-Suez origins than is currently the case. While its role as post-Suez review is not in doubt, it is clear that much of the philosophy of the White Paper was thrashed out in the historiographically neglected Since 1953, the annual Defence White Papers had included reassuring paragraphs on civil and home defence (for this purpose, they were essentially synonyms) stressing the measures which had been taken which would save lives in a future atomic war. In short, the government's discourse on nuclear war had included emphasising some public protection, and when later in 1957 this promise of protection was seemingly withdrawn, or least enormously undermined, there could not fail to be important political and social consequences.
The Policy Review 1956
24 NA, AIR Shortly after the major decisions on home defence had been taken in late 1955 and early 1956, the Eden Government began a major review to consider what changes could be made in British policy, considering the nation's economic circumstances and given that it was now believe general war would be unlikely due to the destructive power of the hydrogen bomb. 27 Never fully completed because of Suez, the Policy Review's (PR) attempt at reconciling foreign policy aims with domestic policy and Britain's economic weakness (especially in terms of strategy) had important repercussions for the following year's White Paper, but has failed to receive the attention it deserves. 28 It did not seek a dramatic reorientation of Britain's political or economic strategy, but argued this strategy was endangered by the excessive burdens placed upon the economy:
it is clear that since the end of the war we have tried to do too muchwith the result that we have only rarely been free from the danger of economic crisis…. Unless we make substantial reductions in the Government's claims on the national economy we shall endanger our capacity to play an effective role in world affairs. We must therefore concentrate on essentials and reduce other commitments. Only thus shall we be able to find the means to place our economy on a stable basis and to counter the new forms of attack with which we are being confronted. initiatives, all seemed to fit nicely with the pressing economic need for cuts. 27 The 'master document' of this review was NA, CAB 134/1315. PR (56) Macmillan, Chancellor when PR was meeting, was relieved, noting in his diary that 'the military are beginning not only to talk about the Hydrogen Bomb strategy but to contemplate putting it into effect'.
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Of more immediate concern for Macmillan was the pressing need for savings of £100 million in government expenditure. 'The £100 million' dominated the domestic business of the government throughout the summer months and even before Suez diverted Ministerial attention from the review, PR had neglected its longer-term strategic aspects and become more concentrated on Macmillan's expenditure demands.
But whereas most of the policy changes implicit in PR's initial deliberations had to wait until 1957, it had sufficiently set the strategic agenda to see an enormous cut in civil and home defence provision. This cut was demanded by Macmillan on financial grounds, and contributed greatly to his £100 million, but it was also acceded to on strategic grounds, demonstrating, as we shall see, a deep belief in the deterrent value of the nuclear weapon.
Of integral importance was the belief expressed by Eden that 'we must now cut our coat according to our cloth… there is not much cloth' and specifically that 'in our defence programme generally we are doing too much to guard against the least likely risk, viz. Committee on the grounds that Monckton was officially responsible for co-ordination of all defence measures. Thus Monckton was able to recommend swingeing cuts in LloydGeorge's budget, reducing 'defence expenditure' but maintaining his own departmental allocation. 35 In fact Monckton's strategy earned him a rebuke by Eden the following month, the text of which implied that Monckton was not ensuring a fair allocation of resources within the defence budget for home defence and, crucially, he was attempting to deal with the Home Secretary in manner he dealt with the service ministers. 36 The experiment of Ministry of Defence overlordship was scrapped the following year.
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Monkcton's proposed PR cuts involved a variety of measures, but mainly rested on cutting all stockpiling expenditure, to contribute some £12 million (including some £5 million already previously agreed) to 'the £100 million' of cuts in the current financial year.
Monckton also argued that further cuts would follow in future years as home defence was radically overhauled. By discontinuing expenditure 'designed to enable us to "survive" a war and to "recover"', enormous savings could be made. Monckton's only caveat was that 'our discontinuance of these preparations should not be so abrupt as to cause a shock to our allies and our own public'. All that should be continued were 'those home defence preparations the absence of which would be liable to undermine the deterrent'. These were: measures for the continuity of government and control of the population, communications for air defence and for air-raid warning, and the maintenance and training of civil defence forces and of military forces allocated to home defence. These three policy strands were needed because without them 'all central command would come to an end and complete chaos would ensue the moment the first bombs fell'. 38 In all, this would allow home defence spending to fall to under £30 million in 1957/8 and under £20 million a year thereafter. new assumptions on which our defence policy was to be based'. Stockpiling accounted for some £383 million of the total £629 million home defence programme agreed in principle just six months previously. Although allowing 'this country to be involved in global war without adequate stocks would be catastrophic', it was considered that 'such a war would be catastrophic in any case -not only to this country but to the human race -and it was unlikely that the presence or absence of stocks would be a material factor in a Government's decision on whether to allow this country to become involved in a global war '. 40 This abandonment of the traditional conception of home defence as a means to survive and recover from a war did not mean the end of the volunteer civil defence forces. As
Monckton put it in his original paper, 'we must continue to take an active interest in civil defence… otherwise the volunteer forces will wither away'. Vitally, 'our policy would not be one of providing a façade, and we must be careful not to think in such terms'. What Monckton meant was the new conception of home defence -maintenance of the deterrent -would have to be explained publicly, and 'that within these limits, our home defence preparations will be realistic and not a façade'. 41 This could only occur if the Government were prepared to announce the adoption of the new rationale and the abandonment of the publicly held policy that civil and home defence preparations were designed to save lives. Of course, if the government failed to do this then the revised civil defence policy would indeed be a façade, one that would be increasingly difficult to maintain. Herein lies the origins of the controversial passage in the Sandys White
Paper that there was no adequate defence and the rather less well remembered section detailing the continued importance of home defence in the thermonuclear era.
In outlining his strategy, Monckton neatly delineated the fundamental difference in This divergence meant that when the Home Office finally had the opportunity to comment, on 18 June, a bitter argument ensued. Lloyd-George had not been consulted at all over Monckton's paper, 42 and when he was, it was in the form of a paper suggesting a policy which the Policy Review had in fact already agreed on. 43 The excluded minister reacted angrily to the suggestion that provision be cut so radically, especially because he had not been informed of the revised strategic assumptions on which the cuts were apparently based. He fumed: 'the fact that the chances of global war are receding is not enough to warrant such a disproportionate cut in the expenditure that has been previously regarded as an absolute minimum'. He despaired that the 'long term plan' on which 'so much thought was given last winter' had been annulled.
44
Lloyd-George envisaged the dark consequences of such a cut: it was his belief that the voluntary civil defence organisation 'would very soon break up of its own accord' if its work was not placed in the context of a wider, thorough home defence policy of the sort being abandoned by Monckton. Such a cut could 'be justified only if it is the Government's considered view that global war can be discounted altogether'. 45 The Home Secretary's anger was unsurprising. As he put it, the previous home defence policy had been painstakingly put together over the course of many meetings and many months, and had settled on a course of providing the bare minimum necessary to enable
Britain to fight and survive a nuclear war. Six months later, this carefully constructed policy was ripped up in less than a week, by a group he played no part in. Brook's snap review of home defence, completed within days, reluctantly upheld
Monckton's new 'deterrent-only' policy. 48 Although strongly guided to support the new PR-favoured £25 million limit, with Brook arguing that as the £100 million needed for a survival-and-recovery policy was out of the question, an extra £15 million more 'would largely be money down the drain' as it could not hope to achieve real results', 49 the Committee reacted strongly to the cut. 50 It was pointed out that without stockpiles of food, medical supplies or fuel, the home defence effort would collapse: no survivors could be treated and more would probably die of starvation than from the actual enemy attack.
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Thus when Brook reported back to the Ministerial Home Defence Committee, he argued that if any money over that supplied to the basic policy could be found, it should be devoted to food stockpiling on the grounds of maintaining the deterrent. Ministers were informed that officials believed expenditure of less than £25 million was unfeasible, and Ibid. that if more could be found stockpiling should be continued, but that the Monckton policy could proceed at a cost of between £25-30 million a year. 52 Ministers were warned, however, of the risks such a policy entailed. It would be difficult 'to reinstate quickly any insurance against the failure of the deterrent'. Also, Brook made it clear 'that the absence of an insurance against the failure of the deterrent could not be concealed. In particular, although no information about the size of food stocks is made public, the fact that they were being run down would become widely known'. When PR met on 13 July, Macmillan's proposal was savaged by Monckton and LloydGeorge (invited for the first time). Monckton explained: 'though the risk of global war in the near future might be remote, the possibility of global war could not be ruled out altogether', and the new policy maintained 'a sufficient level of defence preparations to ensure that the deterrent could operate and that the Russians were not led to believe that they could destroy this country in one attack without being destroyed themselves'.
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Moreover, 'if the Civil Defence Services were stood down it would be impossible to conceal the fact, which would be likely to have a disturbing effect' both on public opinion and on Britain's allies'. 59 Lloyd-George, converted to Monckton's plan out of the necessity of defending civil defence from Macmillan's even more devastating cuts, now argued that £25-30 million a year was 'the lowest level on which it would be possible to maintain a successful home defence programme'. Moreover, the steady decline in civil defence spending since 1954 had left the 'growing impression that the 55 Government had accepted that nothing could be done about civil defence in global war.
There was a risk that a defeatist attitude might spread throughout the country'. 60 Monckton's triumph resulted in a three-year plan based on this policy being completed in December. 61 When commenting on the plan, Brook informed the Cabinet in January 1957 that the officials most closely involved with civil defence had stressed 'the difficulty of defending a home defence programme which makes no significant provision for the survival of the country in the event of nuclear attack'. 62 They also suggested 'that it might be easier to justify this programme by reference to the general financial and economic conditions than by reference to any revised appreciation of the risk of global war'. 63 It was followed up by a remarkable broadside by Lloyd-George.
The new policy, he argued in his last Cabinet paper two days before he left the Cabinet alongside the broken Eden, would cause people to conclude that 'the real reason for the reduction is not so much the reduced risk of war as a Government decision that civil defence preparations are of little value'. 64 He believed that if this view became widespread existing civil defence preparations would be jeopardised, thus undermining the deterrent. Evoking the 'widespread defeatism' felt after knowledge of the hydrogen bomb became public, Lloyd-George warned that only 'reiterated assurances that the Government was still convinced of the value of civil defence' could avert a calamitous collapse of confidence within civil defence and discourage local authorities following the example of Coventry and abandoning civil defence. 65 This was in stark contrast to
Monckton's argument in PR that support for the deterrent would be secured only by boldly stating that civil defence cuts were warranted by the decreased likelihood of global war and the fact that measures existed not to save lives, but to maintain the deterrent.
The White Paper and After
After Though the Hunters and Javelins of the Royal Air Force would, in the event of war with Russia, be able to take a substantial toll of Soviet Bombers, a proportion would inevitably get through. Even if it were only a dozen, they could, with hydrogen bombs, inflict widespread devastation and might well blot out a large part of the population of the big cities. It must be frankly recognised that fighters cannot give the country as a whole any effective protection against the catastrophic consequences of nuclear attack. Clearly therefore the central aim must be to prevent war rather than to prepare for it. In present circumstances the only way to deter nuclear aggression is to possess the means of retaliating in time. Passive preparations for nuclear war must take second place to active measures to prevent war; and expenditure on civil defence must as far as possible be curtailed. Nevertheless, plans must be made to enable organised society to survive. The civil defence services will be maintained, and will be supplied with adequate equipment for training. The work of strengthening essential communications will continue. Research and planning will go forward.
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The lack of life-saving measures is implicit, and no-one could remain under the impression that civil defence was considered to be vital aspect of the state's cold war stance. Understandably, one Cabinet critic (presumably Butler as the Minister responsible), stated that 'the treatment of civil defence… would need further consideration, particularly in the light of the statement that the great cities could not at present be defended against nuclear attack'.
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When the next draft appeared eleven days later, the deterrent section had been amended; it now read: 'it must be frankly recognised that there is at present no means of protecting the people of Britain against the catastrophic consequences of an attack with nuclear weapons…. This grim fact makes it more than ever clear that the overriding consideration in all military planning must be to prevent war rather than to prepare for it '. 69 These omissions changed the sense of the White Paper: whereas before it argued that fighters could not stop bombers delivering their payloads, it now suggested that there was no defence at all from nuclear weapons; whereas before the deterrent strategy (needed to stop bombs being delivered) could have been reconciled with civil defence (needed in case deterrence failed), now the need for civil defence seemed to be contradicted. Although in the published version the key sentence was amended slightly, this had no impact on the overall impression produced by the contrasting sections. The rolling series of amendments to the civil defence section also had important consequences. Although the original draft may have lacked nuance, it at least made it absolutely clear that there was a strategic rationale behind the cuts in provision, and that Britain's ability 'to deter nuclear aggression' made civil defence much less important.
By the final version of the White Paper this link between civil defence and the deterrent had been lessened as much as the policy's continued worth had been reiterated.
Paragraph 21 of the published version read: 'While available resources should as far as possible be concentrated on building up an active deterrent, it would be wrong not to take some precautions to minimise the effects of nuclear attack, should the deterrent fail to prevent war. Civil Defence must accordingly play an essential part in the defence plan'. There followed a brief list of measures which would 'provide a framework for expansion, should that later be necessary'.
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Hence the amendments to the original draft had the result of simultaneously: a) undermining the case for civil defence by suggesting that nothing could help the population in a nuclear war; and b) undermining the case for deterrent by stressing the continued need for civil defence in case it failed. In the original draft, the possibility of the deterrent failing was barely raised, and what we can see in the transition from first to final draft is the retreat of the 'Moncktonian' vision of civil defence from its 1956 victory, and advance from the brink of complete defeat of the traditional 'Gwilymian' view -at least in terms of statements in the White Paper. In actuality, of course, civil defence had been severely curtailed, but the original idea expressed within PR was for the sharp decline in civil defence spending to be explained in strategic terms, as evidenced in the original draft of the Sandys Paper. However, when the White Paper was published, the emphasis on the deterrent dominated public discourse on the document; no discussion of civil defence lessened it. Nor did the redrafting of the civil defence sections seem to impinge on the public mind. This is because much more was made of the 'no adequate defence' statement. It is standard for historians of the nuclear disarmament movement to stress the importance of the Sandys White Paper in inspiring the groundswell of opinion which occurred in 1957-58. 83 The origins of CND are complex -the movement coalesced from other groups, especially those campaigning against nuclear testing. The 1957
White Paper was one of two key events. By stressing Britain's adherence to a deterrent strategy, it made British use of hydrogen bombs seem much more likely; also, rationalising nuclear weapons and seeking to integrate them with 'normal' weapons seemed immoral to some. The second key event was Nye Bevan's famous 'emotional spasm' speech at that year's Labour Conference. 84 By ruling out unilateralism Bevan essentially 'disenfranchised' its supporters -without the Labour Party, the disarmers had to stand alone and speak for themselves. What is not so well understood was the importance of the civil defence debate in allowing opponents of the Government's nuclear policy to frame their criticisms. In an obvious way, for the councillors of St Pancras (or Coventry), stopping local civil defence measures was the only way of striking at the Government. By flagging its 'pointlessness', they were highlighting the contradictions in the Government's civil defence policy, questioning the worth of nuclear weapons if they presaged total destruction for all. Early CND propaganda did much the same thing. For example, a 1958 pamphlet by unilateralist historian A.J.P.
Taylor made much of the admission: 'there is no defence against the H-bomb, according to the Minster of Defence. No preparation can be made to secure the civilian population. And it is official policy that none can be made'. 85 A major element of CND's success, in historian Meredith Veldman's words, 'was to convince ordinary individuals that they knew better than the experts, that the almost instinctive emotional revulsion against the idea of nuclear war should be trusted as much as or more so than any strategic calculations'. 86 Using the White Paper's admission as a didactic tool allowed the disarmers to promote their 'populist moralism', 87 ridiculing politicians in the process. From St Pancras to early CND, the Sandys White Paper's admission that the bomber will always get through was turned into an admission that civil defence was useless and that nuclear exchange would cause utter annihilation, which of course underpinned CND's fundamental case that the bomb was both immoral and insane. The importance of the new warning system in saving lives was outlined in a 1959 Home
Office pamphlet, 94 but little else was said about civil defence in the years following
Sandys. An illustrative case was provided by the intervention of Harold Macmillan, who in September 1958 was dissatisfied with civil defence spending concentrating on the Civil Defence Corps when it clearly would not save many lives. 95 When the possibility of scrapping the Corps was raised, however, the Defence Committee decided it was safer to do nothing, because 'any change in the existing policy, whether directed to expanding or curtailing the limited preparations already being made, would be liable to attract attention and so to provoke discussion of an issue to which public opinion appeared at present to be remarkably indifferent'. Instead, the government would continue to 'acquiesce' in the policy's 'fundamental illogicality… realising that its main purpose was to maintain the morale of the population rather than to provide them with any effective protection against nuclear attack'. 96 This belief that civil defence should be left well alone, and that the Corps needed to continue for morale rather than lifesaving purposes, was upheld during a thoroughgoing review of civil defence which lasted for much 1960. 97 In this sense, the compromise policy thrashed out in 1956 and enshrined in Sandys determined the civil defence agenda until well into 1960s.
Conclusion
The home defence paradigm of the Sandys White Paper has been an ill-understood element of British defence history. Key paragraphs from the document had a major impact on British society and on public perceptions of British nuclear policy. Also, the origins of those paragraphs lie in a fiercely contested Whitehall debate concerning the necessity of home defence measures in the thermonuclear age. Home Secretary, on the other hand, counselled that such an argument would encourage 'defeatism' and invite criticism, instead suggesting maintaining the fiction of survival measures and justifying reductions on economic grounds (thus allowing the Government to continue to 'encourage' civil defence). In the final paper, a mixed approach was taken, stressing the need for home defence but also admitting that there was no real prospect of protection. Unsurprisingly, one effect of the Paper was the long-term opprobrium of the nuclear disarmers, as predicted by Gwilym Lloyd-George.
Sandys was an important document in the history of civil and home defence, but civil and home defence was also of vital importance in the shaping, reception and legacy of the White Paper itself. As soon as it was published, criticism of the Government's new deterrent policy began in the form of attacks on the lack of civil defence preparations, or rather their worthlessness. Civil defence was the entry point for critics of the new strategy as its apparent absence demonstrated the flaws in the plan: any use of Britain's 'deterrent' would bring automatic and utter destruction. In vain the Government protested that civil defence remained a key policy, but the lack of real belief in the measures within Whitehall was palpable. Perhaps the most famous sentence ever to appear in a Defence White Paper was routinely misquoted -and always quoted out of context -but it did appear to sum up the spirit of the White Paper and the Government's attitude to civil defence as thrashed out in 1956. In this sense, Gwilym Lloyd-George was right and the reality of the government's thinking on civil defence would become widely understood. Successive Ministers of Defence, however, were also proved correct in the sense that disarmament never came close to becoming a majority opinion amongst the British public and that once explained, it seem, the deterrent strategy was understood and supported.
